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Abstract
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payo⁄ types
can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their
beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payo⁄ types are strategically distinguishable
if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent
essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents.
A social choice function - mapping payo⁄ type pro￿les to outcomes - can be robustly virtu-
ally implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space
achieves an outcome arbitrarily close to the social choice function. This de￿nition is equivalent
to requiring virtual implementation in iterated deletion of strategies that are strictly dominated
for all beliefs. The social choice function is robustly measurable if strategically indistinguishable
payo⁄ types receive the same allocation. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and
robust measurability are necessary and su¢ cient for robust virtual implementation.
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1 Introduction
Suppose that a social planner would like to design a mechanism that will induce self-interested
agents to make strategic choices that will lead to the selection of socially desirable outcomes. A
social choice function speci￿es the social desired outcomes as a function of unobserved payo⁄types
of the agents. The planner would like to be sure that outcomes speci￿ed by the social choice
function arise with probability arbitrarily close to 1: thus she requires virtual implementation; she
would like every possible equilibrium to virtually implement the social choice function: thus she
requires full implementation; and she would like every equilibrium to virtually implement the social
choice function whatever the agents￿beliefs and higher order beliefs about others￿types; thus she
requires robust implementation. In this paper, we provide a characterization of when robust virtual
implementation is possible in a general interdependent preference environment.
One necessary condition for robust virtual implementation will be ex post incentive compatibility:
under the social choice function, each agent must have an incentive to truthfully report his type
if others report their types truthfully, whatever their types. Ex post incentive compatibility is
su¢ cient to ensure the existence of desirable equilibria, but, as the existing incomplete information
implementation literature has emphasized, further restrictions on the social choice function are
required to rule out other, undesirable, equilibria. If a mechanism is to fully implement a social
choice function, it must be that two types who are treated di⁄erently by the social choice function
are guaranteed to behave di⁄erently in the implementing mechanism. The key result in this paper
is a characterization of when two payo⁄ types are strategically distinguishable in this sense that
they can be guaranteed to behave di⁄erently. Now a second necessary condition for robust virtual
implementation will be robust measurability: strategically indistinguishable types are treated the
same by the social choice function. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and robust
measurability are also su¢ cient for robust virtual implementation (under an economic assumption).
Thus the core of our contribution is an analysis of strategic distinguishability. Fix an inter-
dependent preferences environment, with a ￿nite set of agents, each with a ￿nite set of possible
payo⁄ types, with expected utility preferences over lotteries depending on the whole pro￿le of types.
Two payo⁄ types of an agent are strategically distinguishable if they have disjoint rationalizable
strategic choices in some ￿nite game for all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs about others￿
types. Thus a pair of payo⁄ types are strategically indistinguishable if in every game, there exists
some action which each type might rationally choose given some beliefs and higher order beliefs.
2We are able to provide an exact and insightful characterization of strategic distinguishability. If
we have sets of types, ￿1 and ￿2, of agents 1 and 2, respectively, we say that ￿2 separates ￿1
if knowing agent 1￿ s preferences and knowing that agent 1 is sure that agent 2￿ s type is in ￿2,
we can rule out at least one type of agent 1. Now consider an iterative process where we start,
for each agent, with all subsets of his type set and - at each stage - delete subsets of actions that
are separated by every remaining subset of types of his opponents. A pair of types are said to be
pairwise inseparable if the set consisting of that pair of types survives this process. We show that
two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they are pairwise inseparable.
If there are private values and every type is value distinguished, then every pair of types will be
pairwise separable and thus strategically distinguishable. Thus strategic indistinguishability arises
when the degree of interdependence in preferences is large. We can illustrate this with a simple




￿j. Each agent has quasilinear utility, i.e., his utility from money is linear and additive.
We show all distinct pairs of types are strategically distinguishable if j￿j < 1
I￿1 where I is the
number of agents. All pairs of types are strategically indistinguishable if j￿j ￿ 1
I￿1.
Our characterization result for strategic distinguishability (Theorem 1) comes in two parts. If
two types of an agent are pairwise inseparable, then they belong to a set of types which are not
separable by a pro￿le of sets of types of that agent￿ s opponents. The set of types of each opponent
in that pro￿le is then not separable by a pro￿le of sets of types of that opponent￿ s opponents. And
there is a continuing chain of inseparable sets in the chain. We prove that pairwise inseparable types
are strategically indistinguishable (Proposition 1) by induction, showing that in any mechanism at
any stage in the iterated deletion of messages that are never best responses and for every set of types
in the chain of inseparable type sets, there is a common action which is played. The inseparability
property ensures that we can always construct beliefs for each type that make the same message a
best response.
To show the converse result (Proposition 2), we construct a ￿nite maximally revealing mechanism
with the property that all pairwise separable types have disjoint sets of rationalizable actions. The
construction exploits the linearity of expected utility preferences and duality theory. Whenever a
set of types of one agent is separated by a pro￿le of sets of types of other agents, we are able to
construct a ￿nite set of lotteries such that knowing the ￿rst agent￿ s preference over those lotteries
will always rule out at least one of his types. We can take the union over all such ￿nite sets
3constructed for each pro￿le of type sets where the separability property holds. We then construct
a ￿nite ￿test set￿of lotteries such that knowing an agent￿ s most preferred outcome in that test set
implicitly reveals his ranking of outcomes in all the original sets. Finally, we consider a mechanism
where each agent gets to pick a lottery with some positive probability, then guesses which lotteries
others chose and gets to pick another lottery, with small probability, contingent on other agents
making the choice he conjectured, and so on. With a large, but ￿nite, number of stages this
mechanism will eventually lead pairwise separable types to make distinct choices.
Our proof of the su¢ ciency of ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability (corol-
lary 1) for robust virtual implementation builds on an ingenious construction used by Abreu and
Matsushima (1992b) to establish an extremely permissive result for complete information virtual
implementation; in Abreu and Matsushima (1992c), they adapted the argument to a standard
Bayesian virtual implementation problem; we in turn adapt the argument to our robust virtual
implementation problem.
While our su¢ ciency argument for robust virtual implementation builds on Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992c), the interpretation of our results ends up being rather di⁄erent. Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992c) characterized virtual implementation in a standard Bayesian environment, where
there was common knowledge of a common prior over a ￿xed set of types, using the solution con-
cept of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies and restricting attention to well-behaved
(￿nite) mechanisms. Bayesian incentive compatibility of the social choice function is a necessary
condition: a standard compactness argument shows that the weakening to virtual implementation
does not weaken the incentive compatibility requirement. In addition, they showed that a measur-
ability condition was necessary. Put each agent￿ s types into equivalence classes that have the same
preferences over outcomes, unconditional on other agents￿types. Having distinguished some types
by their unconditional preferences, we can then further re￿ne agents￿types, by distinguishing types
with di⁄erent preferences conditional on other agents￿types in the ￿rst stage. We can continue this
process of re￿ning agents￿types based on preferences conditional on other agents￿types revealed
so far. The social choice function is Abreu-Matsushima measurable if it is measurable with respect
to the limit of this iterative re￿nement. This seems to be a weak restriction that is generically
satis￿ed.1 Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) show that Bayesian incentive compatibility and Abreu-
1Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) and Serrano and Vohra (2005) note that a simple su¢ cient condition for all
social choice functions to be A-M measurable is type diversity: every type has distinct preferences over lotteries
unconditional on others￿types.
4Matsushima measurability are su¢ cient as well as necessary for virtual implementation in iterated
deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Robust virtual implementation is equivalent to requiring that there is a single mechanism that
implements a social choice function, for all possible type spaces that could be constructed for the
environment with ￿xed payo⁄ types and utility functions for the agents. It is instructive to see
how to get from Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) to the robust virtual implementation results in
this paper.
Observe that Abreu and Matsushima (1992c)￿ s solution concept naturally uses agents￿given
beliefs about others￿types in their solution concept: when strategies are deleted, it is because they
are strictly dominated conditional on their beliefs. We want implementation for all possible beliefs;
we therefore establish our results under an incomplete information version of rationalizability that
does not make use of any beliefs over others￿types; it is equivalent to iteratively deleting strategies
that are ex post strictly dominated, i.e., strictly dominated for all possible beliefs over others￿types.
We work with this solution concept throughout the paper. However, results from the epistemic
foundations of game theory establish that an action is rationalizable in this sense for a payo⁄ type
if and only if it could be played in an equilibrium on some type space with beliefs and higher
order beliefs, by a type with that payo⁄ type (Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2003)). Thus a bonus of our ￿robust￿ analysis is that the distinction between
equilibrium and rationalizability (or iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies) becomes
moot.
Now ex post incentive compatibility is the robust analogue of Bayesian incentive compatibility
and robust measurability is the robust analogue of measurability of Abreu and Matsushima (1992c).
They could reasonably argue that - in a standard Bayesian setting - their measurability condition
is a weak technical requirement.2 As a result, the ￿bottom line￿ of the virtual implementation
literature has been that full implementation, i.e., getting rid of undesirable equilibria, does not
impose any substantive constraints beyond incentive compatibility, i.e., the existence of desirable
equilibria. By requiring the more demanding, but more plausible, robust formulation of incomplete
information, we end up with a condition that is substantive (imposing signi￿cantly more structure
in interdependent value environments than incentive compatibility) and easily interpretable.
2Although Serrano and Vohra (2001) describe an economic example where all non-trivial individually rational
and Bayesian incentive compatible social choice functions fail Abreu-Matsushima measurability because types have
identical conditional preferences.
5This paper adds to a recent literature on robust mechanism design that provides one opera-
tionalization of the so-called ￿Wilson doctrine￿that progress in practical mechanism design will
come from relaxing the implicit common knowledge assumption in the formulation of mechanism
design problems.3 Neeman (2004) highlighted the fact that full surplus extraction with correlated
type results (Myerson (1981) and Cremer and McLean (1985)) rely on the implicit assumption
that there is common knowledge of a mapping from beliefs to payo⁄ types of all agents (a ￿beliefs
determine preferences￿property). This (counterintuitive) assumption is implied by the ￿generic￿
choice of a common prior on a ￿xed type space where distinct types are assumed to have di⁄erent
preferences. The apparent weakness of the Abreu-Matsushima measurability condition (and the
fact that it is satis￿ed for ￿generic￿priors) relies on the same property. We believe that by relaxing
this unnatural implicit assumption, we get a better insight into the nature of the extra requirement
for full implementation over and above incentive compatibility conditions.
Our operationalization of the ￿Wilson doctrine￿ is rather strong: we put no restrictions on
agents￿beliefs and higher order beliefs. A recent paper of Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2008)
examines what happens to the conditions for robust virtual implementation if the planner is given
partial information about agents￿beliefs, in particular, a subset of beliefs over others￿payo⁄s types
that can arise with each payo⁄ type. We discuss this intermediate robustness approach in section
6.3.
It is possible to interpret our result as rather negative: ex post incentive compatibility is already
a very strong condition, as emphasized by the recent work of Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-Ter-Vehn,
and Zame (2006);4 robust measurability adds the further substantive restriction that there not be
too much interdependence of preferences; and, in any case, the mechanism that we use to robustly
virtually implement social choice functions is complicated to describe and presumably hard to
play. However, we can show that in one large and interesting class of economic environments with
interdependent preferences, robust virtual implementation is not only possible but is possible in
the direct mechanism where agents simply report their payo⁄ types. Say that an environment has
aggregator single crossing preferences if the pro￿le of agents￿types can be aggregated into a single
number and preferences are single crossing with respect to that number. E¢ cient social choice
3Neeman (2004), Bergemann and Morris (2005b), Heifetz and Neeman (2006), Chung and Ely (2007).
4Although we argue in Bergemann and Morris (2009) that ex post incentive compatibility is feasible in many
economically important environments either because types are one dimensional or because natural economic features
of the environment lead to a failure of the ￿generic￿properties that lead to the non-existence of non-trivial ex post
incentive compatible social choice functions in Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006).
6functions satisfying ex post incentive compatibility often exist in such environments. Bergemann
and Morris (2009) showed that in such an environment, exact robust implementation is possible if
the social choice function satis￿es strict ex post incentive compatibility and a contraction property.
In this paper, we observe that the contraction property is equivalent to robust measurability, so
that - under the weak condition that there exists some strictly ex post incentive compatible social
choice function - whenever robust virtual implementation is possible, it is possible in the direct
mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the environment and
the solution concept. Section 3 illustrates the notion of separability in the context of a single private
good with interdependent preferences. Section 4 de￿nes and characterizes strategic distinguisha-
bility, constructing the maximally revealing mechanism to show the equivalence between strategic
distinguishability and pairwise separability. Section 5 reports our results on robust virtual imple-
mentation. Section 6 concludes with discussions of the formal relation between Abreu-Matsushima
measurability and robust measurability, the role of moderate interdependence, intermediate no-
tions of robustness, the epistemic foundations for the solution concept, weak rather than strict













We assume without loss of generality that the cardinality of each set ￿i is equal to S for all i. The
￿nite set X of pure outcomes is given by
X = fx1;:::;xn;:::;xNg:
The lottery space over the set of outcome is Y = ￿(X). A lottery y is an N dimensional vector










We will abuse notation by writing x for the lottery putting probability 1 on outcome x and X for
the set of degenerate lotteries.
It is often convenient to work with underlying preferences over lotteries rather than any of their
representations. We write R for the collection of expected utility preference relations on Y . We
will write R￿i;￿i 2 R for the preference relation of agent i if his payo⁄ type is ￿i and he has belief
￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i) about the types of others:
8y;y0 2 Y : yR￿i;￿iy0 ,
X
￿￿i2￿￿i








and we write P￿i;￿i for the strict preference relation corresponding to R￿i;￿i.
We make a weak assumption on the preferences: every agent i, whatever his type ￿i 2 ￿i and
beliefs ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), has a strict preference over some pair of outcomes:
Assumption 1 (No Complete Indi⁄erence)
For each i, ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), there exist x;x0 2 X such that xP￿i;￿ix0.
We maintain this assumption throughout the paper.5 An analogous condition appeared in
Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) and Serrano and Vohra (2005) in the Bayesian setting for all types
(and associated beliefs) of all agents. But in our robust context, it is a stronger assumption in
the sense that it rules out the possibility that alternative payo⁄ type pro￿les of others lead to a
reversal in the preferences of agent i with respect to some x and x0.
We denote by y the central lottery which puts equal probability on each of the pure outcomes.
Now no￿ complete-indi⁄erence implies that every agent i, whatever his type ￿i and beliefs ￿i 2
￿(￿￿i), strictly prefers some pure outcome x to y; and compactness implies that those strict
preferences are uniformly strict:




￿i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) >
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) + c.
5Our results can be extended to allow for the presence of complete indi⁄erence as shown in the appendix of the
working paper version, Bergemann and Morris (2007).
8The lemma is proved in appendix and we will use c in our later constructions. We will also
exploit the existence of an upper bound on payo⁄ di⁄erences C which follows immediately from
the ￿niteness of pure outcomes and states:
Lemma 2 There exists C > 0 such that
￿ ￿ui (y;￿) ￿ ui
￿
y0;￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ C;
for all i;y;y0;￿.
2.2 Mechanisms and Solution Concept
A mechanism M is a collection ((Mi)
I
i=1 ;g) where each Mi is ￿nite and g : M ! Y . We denote
a belief of agent i over the product of payo⁄ type and message spaces of the other agents by
￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i). We consider the process of iteratively eliminating never best responses,
without making assumptions on agents￿beliefs about others￿payo⁄ types. The set of messages
surviving the k￿th level of elimination for type ￿i in mechanism M are de￿ned by
S0
i [M](￿i) , Mi;
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9 ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i) s.t.:
(1) ￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) m￿i 2 Sk
￿i [M](￿￿i)





￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (m0
i;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i))
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We refer to Si [M](￿i) as the rationalizable messages of type ￿i of agent i in mechanism M. This
incomplete information version of rationalizability was studied in Battigalli (1998) and Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2003). A standard and well known duality argument implies that this solution
concept is equivalent to iterated deletion of ex post strictly dominated strategies.
Si [M](￿i) is the set of messages that type ￿i might send consistent with knowing that his
payo⁄ type is ￿i, common knowledge of rationality and the set of possible payo⁄ types of the other
players, but no restrictions on his beliefs and higher order beliefs about other types. Equivalently,
9it is the set of messages that might be played in any equilibrium on any type space by a type of
player i with payo⁄ type ￿i and any possible beliefs and higher order beliefs about others￿payo⁄
types. In section 6.4, we report a formal argument con￿rming this interpretation. In the body of
the paper, we work directly with this solution concept.
2.3 Separability
We will be interested in the set of preferences that an agent might have if his payo⁄ type is ￿i and
he knows that the type ￿j of each opponent j belongs to some subset ￿j of his possible types ￿j.
Thus writing ￿￿i = f￿jgj6=i for a pro￿le of subsets of i￿ s opponents, we de￿ne
Ri (￿i;￿￿i) = fR 2 RjR = R￿i;￿i for some ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i)g.
We adopt the convention that if for some j 6= i; ￿j = ?, then Ri (￿i;￿￿i) = ?. Now suppose
we observed i￿ s preferences over lotteries and knew that i assigned probability 1 to his opponents￿
type pro￿le ￿￿i being an element of ￿￿i, what would we be able to deduce about i￿ s type? We will
say that ￿￿i separates ￿i if - whatever those realized preferences - we could rule out at least one
possible type of i.
De￿nition 1 (Separation)
Type set pro￿le ￿￿i separates ￿i if
\
￿i2￿i
Ri (￿i;￿￿i) = ?.
We will be interested in a process by which we iteratively delete type sets of each agent that are
separated by some type set pro￿le of his opponents. Thus writing ￿k
i for the kth level inseparable
sets of player i, we have:
￿0



















Finally, we say that a pair of types are pairwise inseparable if they cannot be iteratively sepa-
rated in this way:
10De￿nition 2 (Pairwise Inseparability)
Types ￿i and ￿0








Note that the relation ￿ is re￿ exive and symmetric by construction, but it is not necessarily
transitive. The following ￿￿xed point￿characterization of pairwise inseparability will be useful in
the analysis that follows. Let ￿ = (￿i)
I
i=1 2 ￿I
i=12￿i be a pro￿le of type sets for each agent.
De￿nition 3 (Mutual Inseparability)
￿ is mutually inseparable if, for each i and ￿i 2 ￿i, there exists ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i such that ￿￿i does not
separate ￿i.
Lemma 3 Types ￿i and ￿0
i are pairwise inseparable if and only if there exists mutually inseparable
￿ = (￿i)
I




















￿ ￿￿i ￿ ￿0
i and ￿0





for each k = 0;1;::: . The claim holds for k = 0 by de￿nition. Suppose the claim holds for arbitrary
k and suppose that ￿i ￿ ￿0
i and ￿0
i 2 b ￿i. Because b ￿ is mutually inseparable, there exists ￿￿i 2
b ￿￿i ￿ ￿k
i such that ￿￿i does not separate ￿0
i. By the de￿nition of separation, since ￿i ￿ ￿0
i, ￿￿i












(only if) Observe that ￿k+1
i ￿ ￿k




inseparable. Thus if ￿i ￿ ￿0







3 An Environment with Interdependent Values for a Single Good
We consider a quasi-linear environment with a single good with interdependent values to illustrate
the notion of separability. There are I agents and agent i￿ s payo⁄ type is ￿i 2 [0;1]. If the type
pro￿le is ￿, agent i￿ s valuation of an object is given by:




11with ￿ 2 R+. The parameter ￿ measures the amount of interdependence in valuations: the case of
private values is given by ￿ = 0 and the case of pure common values is ￿ = 1. The net utility of









We determine the conditions for separability of types in this preference environment.6
Type set pro￿le ￿￿i separates ￿i if, knowing i￿ s preferences and knowing that he is sure that
others￿type pro￿le is ￿￿i, we can always rule out some ￿i. In this example, because the utility
function ui (￿) is linear in the monetary transfer for all types and all agents, separability must come
from di⁄erent valuations of the object. For given type set pro￿le ￿￿i of all but i, we can identify































Now ￿￿i separates ￿i if and only if
\
￿i2￿i
Vi (￿i;￿￿i) = ?.
This is equivalent to requiring that
Vi (max￿i;￿￿i) \ Vi (min￿i;￿￿i) = ?.








6This example has a continuum of types and a continuum of deterministic monetary allocations while the general
model was de￿ned for a ￿nite number of types and pure outcomes. We could rewrite the example and the corre-
sponding results without loss in the ￿nite setting. With a ￿nite model, integer problems would need to be taken into
account; in particular, the exact value of the critical threshold for moderate interdependence would depend on the
size of the grid. But as the grid becomes ￿ner, the critical thresholds converge to the ones of the continuum example
here.
12We can rewrite the inequality as




Thus ￿￿i separates ￿i if and only if the di⁄erence between the smallest and the largest element in
the set ￿i is larger than the weighted sum of the di⁄erences of the smallest and the largest element
in the remaining sets ￿j for all j 6= i. Conversely, ￿￿i does not separate ￿i if the above inequality
is reversed, i.e.,
max￿i ￿ min￿i ￿ ￿
X
j6=i
(max￿j ￿ min￿j). (5)



































Thus if ￿ (I ￿ 1) < 1, ￿￿
i consists of singletons, ￿￿
i = (f￿ig)￿i2[0;1], while if ￿ (I ￿ 1) ￿ 1, ￿￿
i consists
of all subsets, ￿￿
i = 2[0;1].
Thus if ￿ < 1
I￿1, so that interdependence is not too large, every distinct pair of types are
pairwise separable. If ￿ ￿ 1
I￿1, every pair of types are pairwise inseparable. We note that the linear
structure of the valuations vi (￿) leads to the strong converse result. But the example illustrates
the general principle that pairwise separability corresponds to not too much interdependence. We
shall state a more general result about the relationship between pairwise separability and not too
much interdependence in Section 6.2. We also note that the argument surrounding the pairwise
separability result relies on the boundedness of the payo⁄ type space. In particular if ￿i = R, then
pairwise separability could only be achieved in the case of of pure private values, i.e. ￿ = 0.
Our later results will show that if ￿ ￿ 1
I￿1, no social choice function (except for a constant one)
is robustly virtually implementable; but if ￿ < 1
I￿1, any ex post incentive compatible allocation
can be robustly virtually implemented. One can construct generalized VCG payments such that
13e¢ cient allocation is ex post incentive compatible in this environment if ￿ ￿ 1. Thus the e¢ cient
allocation is robustly virtually implementable if and only if ￿ < 1
I￿1.
Our result on robust virtual implementation in this environment will contrast with what would
happen with standard Bayesian implementation. Suppose we assumed there was common knowl-
edge of a common prior on the set of payo⁄ types [0;1]
I. Suppose ￿rst that agents￿types were
drawn independently. Then each type would have di⁄erent expected valuations of the object and
could easily be separated. Even if priors were not independent, for a ￿typical￿choice of prior, the
measurability condition of Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) and Bayesian virtual implementation
would be possible as long as incentive compatibility conditions were satis￿ed. Ex post incentive
compatibility (and thus Bayesian incentive compatibility for any prior) is satis￿ed by the e¢ cient
allocation if ￿ ￿ 1.
4 Strategic Distinguishability
4.1 Main Result
Two payo⁄ types are strategically distinguishable if there exists a mechanism where the rationaliz-
able actions of those payo⁄ types are disjoint; thus they are strategically indistinguishable if they
have a rationalizable action in common in every mechanism.
De￿nition 4 (Strategically Indistinguishable)
Types ￿i and ￿0





6= ? for every M.
The notion of strategic indistinguishability is related to the idea of incentive compatibility in the
context of information revelation in a mechanism. The di⁄erence between distinguishability and
incentive compatibility arises from the two central features of strategic indistinguishability. First,
we say that two payo⁄ types can be strategically distinguished if there exists some mechanism and
hence some outcome function for which the types have disjoint rationalizable actions. In contrast,
the analysis of incentive compatibility is typically concerned with a speci￿c mechanism and hence
a speci￿c outcome function. Second, strategic distinguishability requires that the two payo⁄ types
display disjoint rationalizable actions for all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs. In contrast,
the analysis of incentive compatibility is typically concerned with a ￿xed and common prior belief
of the agents.
14The characterization of strategic indistinguishability is the key result in our characterization of
robust virtual implementation.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence)
Types ￿i and ￿0
i are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they are pairwise inseparable.
This result will be proved in two parts. First, Proposition 1 shows that under any ￿nite
mechanism, if ￿i and ￿0
i are pairwise inseparable, then the intersection of the set of rationalizable
messages for ￿i and ￿0
i will always be non-empty. This observation follows easily from our de￿nitions.
Proposition 1
If ￿i and ￿0
i are pairwise inseparable (￿i ￿ ￿0





6= ? in any mechanism
M:
Proof. By Lemma 3, if ￿i ￿ ￿0







Now ￿x any mechanism M. We will show, by induction on k, that for each k, i and ￿i 2 ￿i,
there exists mk
i (￿i) 2 Mi such that mk





for each e ￿i 2 ￿i. This is true by
de￿nition for k = 0. Suppose that it is true for k. Now ￿x any i and ￿i 2 ￿i. Since ￿ is mutually
inseparable, there exists ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i, R and, for each e ￿i 2 ￿i, ￿
e ￿i





i (￿i) be any optimal message of agent i when he believes that his opponents will
sent message pro￿le mk
￿i (￿￿i) with probability 1 and has beliefs ￿
e ￿i
i about the type pro￿le of his
opponents, i.e.,
mk+1


























for all e ￿i 2 ￿i.














for each e ￿i 2 ￿￿






The second part of the theorem￿ s proof is the converse result.
Proposition 2 (Existence of Maximally Revealing Mechanism)
There exists M￿ such that ￿i ￿ ￿0






15Propositions 1 and 2 immediately imply Theorem 1. Proposition 2 is proved by the explicit
construction of a mechanism which will lead every pair of distinguishable types to choose di⁄erent
messages. We refer to the speci￿c mechanism as the ￿maximally revealing mechanism￿ , and spend
the rest of this section describing its construction and ￿nding its properties.
4.2 The Maximally Revealing Mechanism
We will construct a mechanism that will work for any environment. In the canonical mechanism,
each agent is given K simultaneous opportunities to select a preferred allocation from a given ￿test
set￿of allocations. For each opportunity k to select a preferred allocation, with k = 1;:::;K, the
agent is asked to report a pro￿le of possible choices by the remaining agents in the opportunities
preceding the k-th opportunity. If the report of the agent at opportunity k matches the choices of
the other agents in the opportunities below k, then he will be given the right to choose a preferred
allocation. On the other hand, if his report fails to replicate the choices of the other agents in
the opportunities before k, then the designer will simply select the central lottery ￿ y. While the
mechanism is entirely static, it requires each agent to make a series of choices, each one contingent
on the choices of the other agents. In particular, by asking the agent at opportunity k to match his
report with the choices of the other agents at the opportunities before k, we introduce an inductive
structure into the series of choices by each agent. We therefore refer to the k-th opportunity as the
k-th stage or k-th step of the mechanism even though the mechanism itself is entirely static.
The central aspect of the inductive structure of the choice mechanism is that it allows us
to analyze the behavior of the agent in the mechanism in terms of the iterative elimination of
dominated strategies. The precise construction of the choice mechanism is based on two central
concepts, the notion of a test set and the notion of an augmentation of a given mechanism. A test
set will give each agent a ￿nite set of choices and the choice behavior by the agent allows us to
distinguish between di⁄erent types of the agent. The construction of the set of test allocations relies
on a few critical implications of our notion of separation. In turn, the notion of an augmentation
permits us to show that we can always construct a more informative mechanism on the basis of a
given mechanism.
4.2.1 A Class of Maximally Revealing Mechanisms
Fix a ￿nite ￿test set￿of lotteries Y ￿. A maximally revealing mechanism o⁄ers each agent i a series
of K opportunities to select a preferred allocation from Y ￿. The set of messages for each agent in































￿i ￿ Y ￿ ￿ M1
￿i ￿ Y ￿, and so on.
The message mk+1
i of agent i in stage k +1 thus reiterates his message from step k and announces
a possible message pro￿le of the remaining agents in step k. Due to the inductive structure of the
messages, we can write a typical element mk
i 2 Mk
















i and each rk
i 2 Mk￿1
￿i and each yk
i 2 Y ￿. The entry rk
i constitutes the report of agent
i regarding the message of the other agents in the previous stage k ￿ 1. The message set of agent
i is then given by MK
i .
The outcome function in the revealing mechanism is de￿ned as:















































In words, the mechanism has K stages. In each stage k, an agent is asked to announce a stage k￿1
message pro￿le of messages he thinks his opponents might have sent and - with positive probability
- gets to pick a lottery from Y ￿. Lotteries from early stages are much more likely to be chosen
than lotteries from later stages. We can now analyze how the series of messages can iteratively and
interactively identify the types of each agent.
4.2.2 Characterizing Rationalizable Behavior for Small "
For su¢ ciently small " > 0, an agent￿ s choice of a message at the kth stage will be independent of
what messages he thinks others will send at stage k and higher and thus also independent of K, the
17total number of stages of messages that will be sent. We ￿rst propose an inductive characterization
of the set of types of player i who could possibly send kth stage message mk








. We then verify with Lemmas 6 and 8 that our proposed inductive characterization of
rationalizable messages is correct for su¢ ciently small ".
Write BY ￿
i (￿i;￿i) for agent i￿ s most preferred lotteries in the set Y ￿ if he has payo⁄type ￿i and
beliefs ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i) and (with a minor abuse of notation) let BY ￿
i (￿i;￿￿i) be agent i￿ s possible
most preferred lotteries if he has payo⁄ type ￿i and assigns probability 1 to his opponents having













We adopt the convention that if ￿j = ? for some j 6= i, then BY ￿








be the set of types of player i who could possibly send ￿rst stage message m1
i.
Since we will ignore later stages, this will be independent of " and K. Taking these sets as given,







of types of player i who could possibly send second stage message
m2

























, where we recall that by the inductive description of the
message mk+1
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is meant to approximate the set of types of agent i for whom a speci￿c message
mk







is the dual to Sk
i [M](￿i), which
describes the set of messages mi which are rationalizable for a speci￿c type ￿i in stage k. The role







is to track the information that can be inferred from the choices of messages mi
about the type ￿i of agent i.







is heuristic in the sense that the inductive
process assumes the properties (ii) and (iii) in (8). In particular, it is simply assumed that agent
i in stage k + 1 announces a past message pro￿le of the remaining agents which could have been
sent by some type pro￿le of the other agents, and it is simply assumed that agent i will select an
allocation which is a best response to some belief in stage k + 1.
We will use two preliminary results to establish formally that these sets characterize limit
behavior for small " and large K. The routine proofs are reported in the Appendix. First, we
note that for any ￿xed ￿nite mechanism M, when we iteratively delete messages that are not best
responses, they are uniformly worse responses, i.e., there exists ￿M > 0 such that each of those
deleted messages is not even an ￿M-best response.
Lemma 4 (Uniformly Worse Responses)
For any mechanism M, there exists ￿M > 0 such that if mi 2 Sk
i [M](￿i), mi = 2 Sk+1
i [M](￿i) and
￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i) satis￿es
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 Sk
j [M](￿j) for each j 6= i;
then there exists mi such that
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g￿ (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) >
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g￿ (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i))+￿M.
Second, we use the uniform lower bound in stating a key result about ￿augmenting￿mecha-
nisms. We use this ￿augmentation lemma￿in the construction of both the maximally revealing
mechanism (in this section) and the canonical mechanism for robust virtual implementation (in the
next section). For each player i, ￿x ￿nite message sets M0
i and M1
i and let Mi = M0
i ￿ M1
i . Fix
g0 : M0 ! Y , g1 : M1 ! Y and g+ : M ! Y . Fix ￿0;￿1;￿+ ￿ 0 with ￿0 + ￿1 + ￿+ = 1 and let
g : M ! Y be de￿ned by






















We recall that the constant C > 0 is a ￿nite upper bound on the di⁄erence in payo⁄s across all
agents and all pairs of lotteries y and y0, which we established earlier in Lemma 2.
19Lemma 5 (Augmentation)











The lemma states that if the weight ￿0 put on the original payo⁄ function g0 in the augmented
mechanism is much larger than the weight ￿+ put on the other component of the mechanism at
which m0 e⁄ects the allocation, then any rationalizable message in the augmented mechanism must
entail sending a message m0
i that was rationalizable in the original mechanism.
We now show that these choices are indeed the result of iteratively elimination of strictly







is an upper bound on the set of types
who could send kth stage message mk
i in any Mk
" for su¢ ciently small ".
Lemma 6 (Limit)
Suppose that BY ￿





















for all " ￿ " and mk
i 2 Mk
i .







































for all " ￿ "k and mk
i 2 Mk
i :
Now observe that Mk+1
" is an augmentation of Mk
" and thus - by Lemma 5 - there exists "k+1 2





















































































- the last components of mk+1
i - e⁄ect only one additively separable











































































> 0 and yk+1






































> 0 and yk+1
i 2 BY ￿


























i 2 BY ￿
i (￿i;￿i). (13)
21To wit, by the construction of the revealing mechanism (see (7)), the lottery yk+1
i speci￿ed in (13)
only a⁄ects the (expected) payo⁄ of agent i when rk+1
i = mk
￿i. It follows that yk+1
i should be a
best reply to some belief conditioned on the event that rk+1
i = mk
￿i.





























4.3 Constructing a Rich Enough Test Set
Finally, we show that we can choose the ￿test set￿Y ￿ to be su¢ ciently large so that Lemma 6 will
imply that - for su¢ ciently small " > 0 and su¢ ciently large K - any pair of mutually separable
types are sending distinct messages in the (K;") revealing mechanism.
Lemma 7 (Existence of Finite Test Set)
There exists a ￿nite test set Y ￿ ￿ Y such that:
1. for each i, ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), BY ￿
i (￿i;￿i) 6= Y ￿;
2. for each i, ￿i and ￿￿i, if ￿￿i separates ￿i, then for each ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), there
exists ￿0
i 2 ￿i such that
BY ￿







The proof of Lemma 7 is in the Appendix. Now the proof of Proposition 2 is completed by the
following lemma, establishing that the sets ￿
k
i are closely related to kth level inseparable sets ￿k
i ,
as de￿ned earlier in (1)-(3).









￿ ￿i for some ￿i 2 ￿k
i .
Proof. By induction. The claim holds for k = 0 by de￿nition. Suppose for all mk
￿i 2
Mk







￿ ￿i for some ￿i 2 ￿k








































ensures that for every ￿i and ￿i, there exist y;y0 2 e Y such that yP￿i;￿iy0. Thus any best response
will involve setting rk+1
i equal to some mk
￿i that he assigns positive probability to and choosing a
strictly preferred lottery. By our inductive assumption, ￿￿i 2 ￿k
￿i. Now suppose ￿￿i separates
22￿i and ￿x ￿i 2 ￿i. By Lemma 7.2, there exists ￿0
i 2 ￿i such that yk+1















, a contradiction. We conclude that ￿￿i does not separate ￿i.
5 Robust Virtual Implementation
In this section, we use the notions of strategic distinguishability and the maximally revealing mech-
anism to establish necessary and su¢ cient conditions for robust virtual implementation. Virtual
implementation of a social choice function requires a mechanism such that the desired outcomes are
realized with probability arbitrarily close to 1 (see Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) and Abreu and
Matsushima (1992c)). Robust implementation requires implementation of a social choice function
depending on agents￿￿payo⁄ types￿ independent of their beliefs and higher order beliefs about
others￿payo⁄ types (see Bergemann and Morris (2005a) and Bergemann and Morris (2009)). Our
de￿nition of robust virtual implementation is the natural one incorporating both these notions.
5.1 De￿nitions







￿y (x) ￿ y0 (x)
￿
￿.
De￿nition 5 (Robust "-Implementation)
The mechanism M robustly "-implements the social choice function f if
m 2 S [M](￿) ) kg (m) ￿ f (￿)k ￿ ";
f is robustly "-implementable if there exists a mechanism M that robustly "-implements f.
We can now de￿ne the notion of robust virtual implementation.
De￿nition 6 (Robust Virtual Implementation)
Social choice function f is robustly virtually implementable if, for every " > 0, f is robustly "-
implementable.
The relevant incentive compatibility condition required for our robust problem is ex post incen-
tive compatibility.
23De￿nition 7 (EPIC)
Social choice function f satis￿es ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) if, for all i, ￿i, ￿￿i and ￿0
i:










Now ￿robust measurability￿requires that if ￿i is pairwise inseparable from ￿0
i, then the social
choice function must treat the two types the same. This condition is the robust analogue of the
measurability condition in Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) as we formally establish in Section 6.1.
De￿nition 8 (Robust Measurability)
Social choice function f is robust measurable if ￿i ￿ ￿0







It is well known from the literature on virtual Bayesian implementation (e.g., Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992c)) that the relaxation to virtual implementation does not relax incentive compati-
bility conditions by a standard compactness argument.7
Theorem 2 (Necessity)
If f is robustly virtually implementable, then f is ex post incentive compatible and robustly mea-
surable.
Proof. We ￿rst establish ex post incentive compatibility. Fix any mechanism M that robustly
"-implements f. Fix ￿￿i and m￿i 2 SM
￿i (￿￿i). For any m0


















￿ ￿ ". (14)
Now suppose that player i is type ￿i and is convinced that his opponent is type ￿￿i sending message
m￿i. Let mi be any message which is a best response to that belief. Then mi 2 Si [M](￿i), implying
that
kg (mi;m￿i) ￿ f (￿i;￿￿i)k ￿ ". (15)
7Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) and Ledyard (1979) argued in a private value environment that dom-
inant strategy incentive compatibility was implied by Bayesian incentive compatibility for all priors on a ￿xed type
space. In the case of a social choice function, this argument - generalized to interdependent values - shows the
necessity of ex post incentive compatibility (see Bergemann and Morris (2005b)).
24In particular, by the best response property of mi:
































and (15) and Lemma 2 imply




Now combining (16), (17) and (18), we obtain










But virtual implementation implies that this holds for all " > 0, so we have










and this establishes EPIC as necessary condition.
Next we establish robust measurability. Suppose that f is robustly virtually implementable.
Fix any " > 0. Since f is robustly virtually implementable, there exists a mechanism M" such that
m 2 S [M"](￿) ) kg (m) ￿ f (￿)k ￿ ".
Now ￿x any ￿￿i and m"
￿i 2 S￿i [M"](￿￿i). Also ￿x any ￿i ￿ ￿0
i, so by Proposition 1, there exists
m"

























￿￿ ￿ ￿ ". Thus











While we maintain the assumption the mechanism is ￿nite, the same argument implies the ne-
cessity of EPIC and robust measurability if we allow ￿regular mechanisms￿(Abreu and Matsushima
(1992c)), i.e., mechanisms where best replies always exist of any conjecture over opponents￿behav-
ior.
255.3 Su¢ ciency
We ￿rst describe the construction of a canonical mechanism that will be used to establish su¢ ciency.
Our construction follows the logic of Abreu and Matsushima (1992c), which in turn builds on Abreu
and Matsushima (1992b). In the mechanism we construct, each agent simultaneously announces
(i) a message in the maximally revealing mechanism described above; (ii) L announcements of
his payo⁄ type. With probability close to 1
L, the outcome is chosen according the agents￿lth
announcement of their payo⁄ types in part (ii) of their messages. But with small probability, the
outcome is chosen according to the maximally revealing mechanism and their part (i) messages.
The mechanism then checks to see which agents were the ￿￿rst￿to ￿lie￿ , in the sense that his lth
report of his type is not consistent with the message he sent in the maximally revealing mechanism
and no other agent sent an inconsistent message in an ￿earlier￿report. If an agent is not one of
the ￿rst to lie, then the agent is rewarded. For this part of the mechanism, we need an economic
property.
De￿nition 9 (Economic Property)
The uniform economic property is satis￿ed if there exist a pro￿le of lotteries, (zi)
I
i=1, such that, for
each i and ￿, ui (zi;￿) > ui (y;￿) and uj (y;￿) ￿ uj (zi;￿) for all j 6= i.
Under the uniform economic property, there will exist a constant c0 such that
ui (zi;￿) > ui (y;￿) + c0 (19)
for all i and ￿.
In the canonical mechanism, part (i) announcements for the maximally revealing mechanism
are made as if the maximally revealing mechanism was being played as a stand alone mechanism
(since the probability of rewards can be chosen su¢ ciently small). An agent will never allow himself
to be one of the ￿rst to lie: sending a message that ensures that he is not the ￿rst to lie (given his
beliefs about others￿strategies) will always strictly improve on his expected payo⁄, since if others
are telling the truth, truth-telling is a weak best response by ex post incentive compatibility, and
if they are lying, for su¢ ciently large L, the reward will outweigh the cost of not lying in one stage
of the mechanism.







for the maximally revealing mechanism. We use three numbers
in de￿ning the canonical mechanism: c0 is the uniform lower bound on an agent￿ s utility gain from
having his uniformly preferred lottery rather than the central lottery; recall from Lemma 2 that
26C is an upper bound on payo⁄ di⁄erences in the environment; recall from Lemma 4 whenever a
message is deleted in the iterated deletion process for the maximally revealing mechanism M￿, it
is not even an ￿M￿-best response to any conjecture. We will use these three numbers c0, C and
￿M￿, together with the number of players I, to de￿ne two further numbers ￿ and L that will be










Now the message space of the canonical mechanism is
Mi = M￿
i ￿
L times z }| {
￿i ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿i = M￿
i ￿ ￿L
i :










i 2 ￿i for each
l = 1;:::;L. The idea is that an agent is ￿supposed￿to truthfully report his payo⁄ type in each
stage l = 1;:::;L and will receive a small punishment if he is one of the ￿￿rst￿to report a type




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
y, if
9k 2 f1;:::;Lg s.t. m0












8j = 1;:::;I and l = 1;:::;k ￿ 1;
zi, if otherwise.
(In slight abuse of notation, we use ri (m) here to denote rewards whereas we used rk
i earlier in
subsection 4.2.1). Now the outcome function of the canonical mechanism is:
g (m) =
￿
















The mechanism g (m) has three components. The ￿rst component, which carries the largest




by L replicas, each one of which is chosen with a small probability 1=L. The second component is
the maximally revealing mechanism outcome function g￿ which receives a smaller weight of ￿. The
third and ￿nal component, ri (m), represents a small reward or punishment. It is designed to give
27each agent an incentive to replicate in stage l the report issued in the previous stage. It provides
a small ￿punishment￿(y) if player i is the ￿rst to report in the message component, ml
i, a type
inconsistent with previous reports, otherwise ri (m) provides the small ￿reward￿(zi).
Theorem 3 Under the uniform economic property, if f satis￿es EPIC and robust measurability,
then the canonical mechanism ￿ (1 + ￿) robustly implements f.
This immediately implies the su¢ ciency part of our characterization of robust virtual imple-
mentation, since we can choose ￿ arbitrarily close to 0 in the canonical mechanism.
Corollary 1 (Su¢ ciency) Under the uniform economic property, if f satis￿es EPIC and robust
measurability, then f is robustly virtually implementable.








Si [M](￿i) implies that (1) m0
i 2 Si [M￿](￿i) and (2) m0





for each l = 1;:::;L. To
see why, observe that m0





implies ￿i is strategically indistinguishable
from ml











. Since this holds
for each i, we have f
￿
ml￿
= f (￿). Since this is true for each l, we have that the mechanism selects
f (￿) with probability at least 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2.







2 Si [M](￿i) ) m0
i 2 Si [M￿](￿i) - follows from Lemma















2 Si [M](￿i) ) m0





for all i and l = 1;:::;L.
Suppose this claim were false. Then there must exist a smallest l for which the claim fails.
Thus there exists l￿ 2 f1;:::;Lg such that, for all j, mj 2 Sj [M￿](￿j) ) m0













2 Si [M￿](￿i) with m0






Now ￿x any conjecture ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i) with ￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 Sj [M￿](￿j) for all
j 6= i. Consider two cases. First, suppose that
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) m0





for all j 6= i and l = 1;:::;L. (22)
In this case, sending the message
mi = (m0
i;
L times z }| {
￿i;￿i;:::;￿i)
28instead of mi will strictly increase i￿ s utility: since he is certain that each agent is reporting a type
that is strategically indistinguishable in each of the L stages, EPIC and robust measurability ensure
that his utility will not decrease from truthtelling in the L stages; his utility will be unchanged
in the maximally revealing mechanism; and his utility will be strictly increased in the punishment
component. Secondly, i￿ s conjecture ￿i is such that (22) fails. In this case, we can de￿ne
b l = min
n
l 2 f1;:::;Lg : 9(￿￿i;m￿i) with ￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 and m0





for some j 6= i
o
.
Note that b l ￿ l￿. Now sending the message
mi = (m0
i;





instead of mi will strictly increase i￿ s utility: since he is certain that each agent is reporting a type
that is strategically indistinguishable in each of the ￿rst b l￿1 stages, EPIC and robust measurability
ensure that his utility will not decrease from truthtelling in the ￿rst b l ￿1 stages; his utility will be
unchanged in the maximally revealing mechanism; if it turns out that m0







j 6= i, then i￿ s utility will also not be reduced in the b l￿th stage or in the punishment component;
but if it turns out that m0






for all j 6= i, then i￿ s utility will be reduced in the
b l￿th stage by at most
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿ 1
LC and will increase in his own punishment component ri (￿)
by at least ￿2
I c0 (and by the economic property, will not decrease in his opponents￿punishment
components r￿i (￿)). The second term exceeds the ￿rst term by (21).
We conclude that for no conjecture is mi a best response, contradicting our original assumption.
This proves our second claim.
While the basic construction of this proof follows Abreu and Matsushima (1992c), there are
some complications that arise in our robust formulation. The messages sent in the maximally
revealing mechanism do not partition an agent￿ s types. Rather, for each set of types that survives
the iterated deletion of sets that can always be separated, there is a message that may be sent by
all types in that set. So we say that message ml
i is consistent with m0
i if message m0
i is one that
might be sent by m0






The economic property can be weakened along the lines of assumption 2 in Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992c). It would be enough to have the economic property hold for any type set pro￿le ￿
in the inseparable type set ￿￿, i.e. for each set pro￿le ￿ = (￿i)
I
i=1 2 ￿￿, there exists (zi)
I
i=1, such
that, for each i and ￿ 2 ￿I
i=1￿j; ui (zi;￿) > ui (y;￿) and uj (y;￿) ￿ uj (zi;￿) for all j 6= i.
296 Discussion
6.1 Abreu-Matsushima Measurability
We established in the preceding section that robust measurability, jointly with ex post incentive
compatibility, is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for robust virtual implementation. Ex post
incentive compatibility is equivalent to Bayesian incentive compatibility on the union of all type
spaces (Bergemann and Morris (2005b)). We now show that robust measurability is equivalent to
requiring that the notion of measurability originally suggested by Abreu and Matsushima (1992c)
holds on the union of all type spaces.8 To spell out the details of this equivalence result, we need
a formal language for epistemic type spaces in the sense of Harsanyi (1967-68) and Mertens and
Zamir (1985).





, where each Ti is a countable set of types, where
the function b ￿i : Ti ! ￿(T￿i) de￿nes the beliefs that agent i assigns to other agents having types
t￿i and where the function b ￿i : Ti ! ￿i de￿nes the agent i￿ s payo⁄ types. A type space is ￿nite
if each Ti is ￿nite. We ￿x a type space T and write ￿T
ti for the induced preferences of type ti of
agent i over type-contingent lotteries e yi : T￿i ! Y . Thus
e yi ￿ti e y0
i
if and only if
X
t￿i2T￿i









Fix a partition pro￿le H = (Hi)
I
i=1, where each Hi is a partition of Ti. A function e yi : T￿i ! Y















Say that a pair of types ti and t0
i are (T ;H)-distinguishable if there exists H-measurable e yi : T￿i !
Y , such that
e yi ￿T
ti y and y ￿T
t0
i e yi,
where we continue to denote by y the constant uniform lottery.
8We would like to thank an anonymous referee who suggested to investigate the exact relationship between Abreu-
Matsushima measurability and robust measurability.





i=1 be letting each H0
i be the coarsest
partition of the type set Ti, namely fTig and let each Hk+1





Let H￿ be the limit of the sequence of partitions. We say that types ti and t0
i are Abreu￿
Matsushima, or ￿AM￿ , indistinguishable on type space T , written ti ￿T
AM t0
i, if ti and t0
i are in the
same element of the partition H￿
i.
Proposition 3 (Equivalence)
1. If ￿i and ￿0
i are pairwise inseparable, then there exists a ￿nite type space T and a pair of types
ti;t0
i 2 Ti such that (i) b ￿i (ti) = ￿i; (ii) b ￿i (t0
i) = ￿0
i; and (iii) ti ￿T
AM t0
i.
2. Conversely, if there exists a type space T (perhaps in￿nite but countable) and a pair of types
ti;t0
i 2 Ti such that (i) b ￿i (ti) = ￿i; (ii) b ￿i (t0
i) = ￿0
i; and (iii) ti ￿T
AM t0
i, then ￿i and ￿0
i are
pairwise inseparable.
The equivalence result of Proposition 3 suggests a alternative route to establishing the necessity
result for robust implementation in Theorem 2: by the equivalence of robust measurability and
AM measurability on the union of all type spaces, we could prove the necessity by an appeal to the
arguments used in Abreu and Matsushima (1992c). By contrast, our su¢ ciency result (Theorem
3) cannot be established using the arguments and methods in Abreu and Matsushima (1992c): as
the union of all type spaces is not a ￿nite object, the arguments in Abreu and Matsushima (1992c)
- which rely on the ￿niteness of the type space - cannot be applied.
6.2 Interdependence and Pairwise Separability
We illustrated the notions of pairwise and mutual inseparability in Section 3 in the context of a
linear model of interdependent preferences for a single object:




In this linear and symmetric model the parameter ￿ represented the level of interdependence in
the preferences of the agents. We showed that for ￿ < 1=(I ￿ 1), all payo⁄ types of all agents are
pairwise separable and suggested that pairwise separability required not too much interdependence
in the preferences.
31We now establish the relationship between pairwise inseparability and moderate interdepen-
dence in a substantially more general environment. We assume that the utility function of each
agent i is given by a convex combination of a private value utility function vi and an interdepen-
dent utility function wi over the general space of lotteries Y de￿ned in Section 2. The private value
utility function vi:
vi : Y ￿ ￿i ! R
gives rise to distinct preferences for every ￿i:
￿i 6= ￿0






The interdependent utility function wi:
wi : Y ￿ ￿￿i ! R
can depend in an arbitrary way on the type pro￿le ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i of all agents except agent i. For any
￿i 2 [0;1], let u
￿i
i be the utility functions that puts weight 1￿￿i on the private value utility vi and
weight ￿i on the interdependent utility wi:
u
￿i
i (y;￿) , (1 ￿ ￿i)vi (y;￿i) + ￿iwi (y;￿￿i). (23)
The interdependence in the preferences is now described by the vector of weights ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿I) 2
[0;1]
I. For ￿ = (0;:::;0) all payo⁄ types of all agents are pairwise separable as, by assumption,
the private utility function vi gives rise to distinct preferences for all ￿i. Also, for ￿ = (1;:::;1),
we cannot separate any pair of types for any agent. In this case, the preferences of each agent are
independent of his payo⁄type and therefore we cannot expect to separate the payo⁄types of agent
i on the basis of his revealed preference. We parametrize the limit set ￿￿ which by De￿nition 2
describes the set of pairwise inseparable types, by the vector ￿, or ￿￿ (￿).
Proposition 4 (Interdependence)
1. The collection of sets ￿￿












i (1) = 2￿in? for all i.
2. If b ￿ ￿ ￿, then ￿￿
i (￿) ￿ ￿￿
i (b ￿).
The ￿rst part of the proposition determines the structure of the pairwise separable types with
minimal and maximal interdependence. The second part establishes that the sets of pairs of types
32￿i and ￿0
i which are inseparable are weakly increasing in the interdependence parameter ￿. In
particular, it shows that the separability is monotone in the parameter of interdependence. We
should emphasize that as the interdependence is represented by the vector ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿I), the
threshold for complete separability of all types and all agents itself is a multidimensional surface
in the I-dimensional hypercube.
6.3 Intermediate Robustness Notions
The classic Bayesian implementation literature considers implementation on a ￿xed type space.
We believe that this approach - as usually formulated - assumes too much common knowledge
(among the agents and the planner) about the environment. In relaxing these common knowledge
assumptions, we take an extreme approach: we maintain the assumption that there is common
knowledge of the payo⁄ structure of the environment (i.e., the set of possible payo⁄ types of each
agent and how each agent￿ s utility function depends on the pro￿le of payo⁄ types) but do not
restrict agents￿beliefs and higher order beliefs about other agents￿types.
In a recent paper, Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2008) consider what happens to robust
virtual implementation results if one imposes some restrictions on agents￿beliefs in the payo⁄
environment. In particular, call a pair (￿i;￿i) 2 ￿i ￿ ￿(￿￿i) a ￿pseudo-type￿and suppose that
we add the common knowledge that agent i￿ s pseudo-type (￿i;￿i) belongs to a subset Ti ￿ ￿i ￿
￿(￿￿i). When can a social choice function be virtually implemented on all type spaces where
each agent i￿ s pseudo-type belongs to Ti? Note that an agent￿ s pseudo-type pins down his payo⁄
type and belief about others￿payo⁄ types, but not his higher order beliefs. Thus this assumption
is intermediate between the standard approach and our robustness approach. In the special case
where Ti = ￿i ￿￿(￿￿i), this setting becomes the setting of this paper. But if Ti is a strict subset
of ￿i ￿ ￿(￿￿i), the conditions for robust virtual implementation will be weakened.
Now say that ￿pseudo-type diversity￿is satis￿ed if
1. The set of beliefs consistent with a payo⁄type is a compact set, i.e., f￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i)j(￿i;￿i) 2 Tig
is a compact set for each i and ￿i 2 ￿i.







2 Ti and ￿i 6= ￿0
i ) R￿i;￿i 6= R￿0
i;￿0
i.
Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2008) show that if pseudo-type diversity is satis￿ed, then
robust virtual implementation will always be possible if the appropriate incentive compatibility
33conditions are satis￿ed (their Theorem 1). The idea is that agents￿ payo⁄ types can then be
identi￿ed by their preferences over constant lotteries and the Abreu and Matsushima (1992c)-style
argument applied.9
To get a feel for the strength of the pseudo-type diversity condition, we can return to our leading
example in section 3. Recall that each ￿i = [0;1] and vi = ￿i + ￿Ei[
X
j6=i
￿j] is a su¢ cient statistic





be a compact set of beliefs over others￿types
that agent i may have (whatever his payo⁄ type), so his set of possible pseudo-types is the product
set Ti = [0;1] ￿ ￿i. Now if 0 < ￿ ￿ 1
I￿1, so there is not too much interdependence of preferences,
pseudo-type diversity will be satis￿ed if and only if each ￿i is a singleton.10
Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2008) also report the appropriate measurability condition re-
quired for robust virtual implementation if the pseudo-type diversity condition fails (their De￿nition
12 and Theorem 2). This will naturally be intermediate between Abreu-Matsushima measurability
and our robust measurability condition. We can illustrate this also with our example. Suppose
that the probability that agent i assigns to any subset of other agents￿payo⁄ types is always at










￿i (E) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Z
￿￿i2E





and Ti = ￿i ￿ ￿i.
Now suppose that agent i￿ s payo⁄ type is in ￿i and he knows that other agents￿payo⁄ types
are in ￿￿i. If agent i￿ s beliefs are restricted to belong to ￿i, when do there exist a pair of payo⁄




















9The version of ￿pseudo-type diversity￿ which we report is su¢ cient to implement the social choice functions
depending just on payo⁄ types that we study in this paper. Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2008) assume a
slightly stronger version of pseudo-type diversity: they assume that each Ti is ￿nite and that distinct pseudo-types have









i) ) R￿i;￿i 6= R￿0
i;￿0
i. This allows them to implement richer social choice functions that treat
types with the same payo⁄ types (but di⁄erent beliefs over others￿payo⁄ types) di⁄erently.
10This example has a continuum of payo⁄ types, so does not ￿t our formal framework. But we could make the
same point with a ￿nite grid of payo⁄ types.
34Thus ￿￿i ￿￿-separates￿￿i if and only if




Now the argument of Section 3 can be adapted to show that if ￿￿ < 1
I￿1, all pairs of distinct
payo⁄ types will be strategically distinguishable from each other (under ￿ belief restrictions) and
thus incentive compatibility will be su¢ cient for robust virtual implementation. And if ￿￿ > 1
I￿1,
all pairs of payo⁄ types will be strategically indistinguishable from each other (under ￿ belief
restrictions) and robust virtual implementation will be impossible for any (non-constant) social
choice function.
6.4 Rationalizability and All Equilibria on All Type Spaces
Our analysis took as given the solution concept of incomplete information rationalizability for our
environment. Thus we assumed that if the agents￿true payo⁄ type pro￿le was ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿I), they
might send any message pro￿le




Si [M](￿i) , S [M](￿).
Our motivation for employing this solution concept is that we did not want to make any assumption
about agents￿beliefs and higher order beliefs about other agents￿payo⁄types. In fact, suppose one
constructed a ￿type space￿T specifying for each agent a set of possible epistemic types, and, for
each epistemic type, a description of his (known) payo⁄type and his beliefs about others￿epistemic
types. By standard universal type space arguments, we can incorporate any beliefs and higher order
beliefs about others￿payo⁄ types in such a type space. Now the type space T and a mechanism M
together de￿ne a standard incomplete information game. The set of messages that can be sent by
any type of agent i with payo⁄ type ￿i in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game (T ;M) for
any type space T is equal to Si [M](￿i). This result is the straightforward incomplete information
extension of the classic epistemic foundations result of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), showing
that the set of actions that can be played in the subjective correlated equilibria of a complete
information game equals the set of actions that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated
actions in that game. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) reported the incomplete information version
of this result as Propositions 4.2 and 4.3. For completeness, we formally state and prove this result
in the appendix of the working paper version (Bergemann and Morris (2007)).
35This observation means that the gap between the solution concepts of pure strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (Serrano and Vohra (2001), Serrano and Vohra (2005)) and iterated deletion of
(interim) strictly dominated strategies (Abreu and Matsushima (1992c)) in incomplete information
virtual implementation disappears in our robust approach. We consider this to be an attraction
of our approach. The intuition is that the extra bite obtained by the assumption of equilibrium is
lost without complementary strong assumptions on beliefs and higher order beliefs for the imple-
mentation problem.
6.5 Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies
Our incomplete information rationalizability solution concept is equivalent to iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies. What would happen if we looked at iterated deletion of weakly
dominated strategies instead? In other words, we let W0
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It is easy to see that our ￿negative￿results would go through unchanged. If two types are pairwise
inseparable (￿i ￿ ￿0
i) then the argument of Proposition 1 - unchanged - implies that they will have
iteratively weakly undominated actions in common in every mechanism, or





6= ? for all M:
Thus robust measurability is a necessary condition for implementation (virtual or exact) of any
social choice function in iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies in a ￿nite (or compact)
mechanism: the argument of Proposition 2 will go through unchanged in this case.
Abreu and Matsushima (1994) show that their argument for virtual complete information im-
plementation in iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies can be adapted to show the
possibility of exact complete information implementation in iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies, with some extra restrictions on the environment. It is a reasonable conjecture that
this extension could be adapted to the standard incomplete information implementation setting of
36Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) and our robust incomplete information setting. However, we have
not attempted this extension.
Chung and Ely (2001) have shown that in an auction environment with interdependent valu-
ations as in section 3, the e¢ cient outcome can be implemented in the direct mechanism under
iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies (i.e., the solution concept described above) under
the assumption that ￿ < 1
I￿1. Our results supply a strong converse: if ￿ ￿ 1
I￿1, it is not possible to
implement (exactly or virtually) any non-trivial social choice function in iterated deletion of weakly
dominated strategies in any ￿nite (or compact) mechanism, direct or indirect.11
6.6 Implementation in a Direct Mechanism
We restricted attention in this paper to ￿nite mechanisms. Thus the mechanisms here do not
include any of the pathological features of ￿integer games￿that play an important role in the full
implementation literature and have been much criticized (see, e.g., Jackson (1992)). Nonetheless,
the mechanisms in this paper are complex. The canonical mechanism for robust virtual implemen-
tation inherits the complexity of the mechanism of Abreu and Matsushima (1992c), on which it
builds. Our maximally revealing mechanism generating strategic distinguishability is no simpler.
While the mechanisms are theoretically kosher, it has been argued that their complexity and the
logic of the iteration deletion in the mechanism might make them hard to use in practise. For
example, Glazer and Rosenthal (1992) have made this argument about the mechanism used by
Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) for complete information virtual implementation (see Abreu and
Matsushima (1992a) for a response and Sefton and Yavas (1996) for later experiments inspired by
the mechanism).
By requiring robustness to agents￿beliefs and higher order beliefs, we reduce the amount of
common knowledge about the environment that can be used by the planner in designing a mecha-
nism. This will make it harder to achieve positive results (and our robust measurability condition
is rather strong in applications). But one motivation for studying robust implementation is that we
hope that robustness considerations will endogenously lead to simpler mechanisms when positive
results can be achieved. By adapting results from our earlier work on exact robust implementation
in direct mechanisms (Bergemann and Morris (2009)), we can report that, in at least one broad
class of economic environments of interest, whenever robust virtual implementation is possible ac-
11Our results are stated for a lottery space over ￿nite outcomes, but the extension to any compact space and
compact mechanisms is straightforward.
37cording to corollary 1, it is possible in a direct mechanism where agents simply report their payo⁄
types. We say that preferences satisfy aggregator single crossing (ASC) if each agent i￿ s preferences
at type pro￿le ￿ belong to a single crossing class parameterized by hi (￿), where hi : ￿ ! R is a
monotonic aggregator. Bergemann and Morris (2009) established that exact robust implementation
by a compact mechanism is possible if and only if the social choice function satis￿es strict ex post
incentive compatibility and a contraction property on the aggregator functions h = (h1;:::;hI).
In the appendix of the working paper version, we show that under the ASC assumption, robust
measurability is always satis￿ed under the contraction property.
6.7 Exact Implementation and Integer Games
The ￿rst papers on incomplete information implementation focussed on exact implementation.
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Jackson (1991) identi￿ed a Bayesian monotonicity condition
which (together with Bayesian incentive compatibility) was necessary and (under weak economic
conditions) su¢ cient for exact implementation in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Bergemann and
Morris (2005a) provide a robust analogue of this result, showing that ex post incentive compatibility
and a robust monotonicity condition are necessary and - under weak economic conditions - su¢ cient
for exact robust implementation. All these papers follow a tradition in the implementation literature
of allowing very badly behaved mechanisms, like integer games, in proving their general results. In
this paper, we follow Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) in restricting attention to ￿nite - and thus
well-behaved - mechanisms. We brie￿ y discuss the relation between these results in this section:
a more complete and formal discussion in contained in the appendix of the working paper version
(Bergemann and Morris (2007)).
Robust measurability and robust monotonicity turn out to be equivalent in the important class
of aggregator single crossing preferences. However, in general, one can show by example that robust
measurability neither implies nor is implied by robust monotonicity. Thus requiring only virtual
implementation is sometimes a strict relaxation; and allowing badly-behaved mechanisms is some-
times a strict relaxation. We do not have a characterization of when exact robust implementation
by a well behaved mechanism is possible (just as analogous characterizations do not exist for com-
plete information and classical Bayesian implementation). We know only that robust measurability,
robust monotonicity and strict ex post incentive compatibility will all be necessary.
We restrict attention in our analysis to social choice functions rather than social choice cor-
respondences. Bergemann and Morris (2005b) considered the problem of partially robustly im-
38plementing a social choice correspondence, i.e., ensuring that whatever players￿beliefs and higher
order beliefs about others￿types, there is an equilibrium leading to outcomes contained in the so-
cial choice correspondence. In the special case where the social choice correspondence is a function
(and more generally in a class of separable environments), this is possible only if the function (or a
selection from the correspondence in separable environments) is ex post incentive compatible. But
in the general case, we do not have a satisfactory characterization of when partial robust imple-
mentation is possible. For this reason, we have not attempted a characterization of (full) robust
implementation of social choice correspondences.
397 Appendix
The appendix contains omitted proofs from the main body of the paper.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) (24)
for all x 2 X. If
X
￿￿i2￿￿i







for some x0 2 X, we could conclude, that
X
￿￿i2￿￿i












a contradiction. So (24) implies
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) =
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) (25)
for all x 2 X. But (25) implies that R￿i;￿i is indi⁄erent between all pure outcomes and thus all
lotteries. This contradicts assumption 1 on no-complete-indi⁄erence. We conclude that the no-
complete-indi⁄erence assumption implies that (24) fails for all i, i.e., that for all i, ￿i 2 ￿i and
￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), there exists x 2 X such that
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) >
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)). (26)





￿i (￿￿i)[ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿ ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i))] > 0:
Now, note that for each x 2 X the function
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)[ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿ ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i))]
40is continuous in ￿ (in the standard topology). The conclusion follows from the compactness (in the
standard topology) of ￿(￿￿i) and continuity of the maximum operator. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4. Fix any mi = 2 Si [M](￿i). Then there exists k such that mi 2 Sk
i [M](￿i)





￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i)
￿ ￿
￿￿i (￿￿i ￿ m￿i) > 0 ) m￿i 2 Sk
￿i [M](￿￿i) for each j 6= i
o
.
For all ￿i 2 ￿k
i , there exists mi such that
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) >
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)).
By compactness of ￿k
i , there exists "i (mi) > 0 such that for all ￿i 2 ￿k
i there exists mi such that
X
￿￿i;m￿i




￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) + "i (mi).
Now let
￿M = min
i; ￿i and mi= 2Si[M](￿i)
"i (mi);
which establishes the desired bound.￿













for all k ￿ 0. This is true by de￿nition for k = 0; suppose that it is true for k. Now suppose that
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The canonical mechanism asks each agent to make a series of binary choices between the central
lottery ￿ y and a speci￿c lottery y from the test set. If the test set is to be successful in eliciting the
private information from agent i, then the test set should contain a su¢ cient number of allocations
such that for every type ￿i and every belief ￿i of agent i there exists some allocation y that is
strictly preferred to the central lottery ￿ y.
Lemma 9 (Duality)
Type set pro￿le ￿￿i separates ￿i if and only if there exists e y : ￿i ! Y such that
X
￿i2￿i
(e y (￿i) ￿ y) = 0; (27)
and
e y (￿i)P￿i;￿i y; (28)
for all ￿i 2 ￿i and all ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i).
This result says that for each ￿i 2 ￿i, we can identify a direction in the lottery space, e y (￿i)￿y,
that agent i likes whatever his beliefs about ￿￿i, such that the sum of those changes add up to
zero. The lemma follows from the following duality result in Samet (1998):
Proposition 5 (Samet (1998))
Let V1;:::;VS be closed, convex, subsets of the N-dimensional simplex ￿N. These sets have an





v ￿ zs > 0, for each s = 1;:::;S and v 2 Vs:
42This result was introduced in Samet (1998) to provide a simple proof of the observation that
asymmetrically informed agents will trade against each other if and only if they do not share a
common prior, i.e., their posterior beliefs could not have been derived by updating a common
prior.12 Suppose that there are N states and S agents. Each agent s observes one of a collection
of signals about the true state. Each signal leads him to have a posterior v 2 ￿N over the states.
Let Vs be the convex hull of his set of possible posteriors. Notice that Vs represents the set of prior
beliefs he might have held over the state space before observing his signal. Thus posterior beliefs
are consistent with a common prior if and only if the intersection of the Vs sets is non-empty. Now
consider a multilateral bet specifying that if state n was realized, agent s will receive payment zsn
where the total payments sum to zero:
S X
s=1
zsn = 0 for all n:
Writing zs , (zsn)
N




There exists such a bet where every agent has a strictly positive expected value from accepting the
bet conditional on every signal if v ￿ zs > 0, for each s = 1;:::;S and v 2 Vs.
Proof of Lemma 9. By de￿nition, type set pro￿le ￿￿i separates ￿i if, for every R 2 R, there
exists ￿i 2 ￿i such that R￿i;￿i 6= R for every ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i). Write



























is an element of RN. Without loss of generality (since expected utility preferences can be represented
by any a¢ ne transformation), we can assume that each vsw is an element of the N dimensional
simplex ￿N. Now (vsw)
W
w=1 is a collection of W elements of ￿N, and the set of preferences
￿
R￿s
i;￿i : ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i)
￿
,
are represented by the convex hull of (vsw)
W








12This converse to the no trade theorem was originally proved by Morris (1994), by a more indirect duality argument.




By Proposition 5, this is true if and only if there exist z1;:::;zS 2 RN such that
S X
s=1
zs = 0; (29)
and
v ￿ zs > 0; (30)
for all s and all v 2 Vs. But if (zs)
S
s=1 satisfy (29) and (30), we may choose " > 0 su¢ ciently small
such that e y (￿s
i) = y + "zs 2 Y for each s, and we have established (27) and (28).
Conversely, if (27) and (28) hold and we set zs = e y (￿s




We now use Lemma 9 to show how, if ￿￿i separates ￿i, we can construct a ￿nite set of lotteries
e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) ￿ Y such that knowing that agent i knows that his opponent￿ s type is in ￿￿i and
knowing his preferences on e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) will always be enough to rule out at least one type in ￿i
for agent i.
Lemma 10 If ￿￿i separates ￿i, then there exists a ￿nite set e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) ￿ Y , such that for each
￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), there exists y 2 e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) such that
yP￿i;￿iy; (31)







Proof. By Lemma 9, there exists e y : ￿i ! Y such that
X
￿i2￿i
(e y (￿i) ￿ y) = 0;
and
e y (￿i)P￿i;￿iy for all ￿i 2 ￿iand ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i):




with y1 = e y (￿i). Let y0 = y and




with " > 0 chosen su¢ ciently small such that yl 2 Y for all l = 1;:::;K. We know y1 P￿i;￿i y0.
Suppose yl+1 R￿i;￿i yl for all l = 1;:::;K ￿ 1. By transitivity, this would imply that yK P￿i;￿i y0.
But yK = y0, so we have a contradiction. We conclude that, for some l = 1;:::;K ￿ 1, yl P￿i;￿i
yl+1. This implies that there exists ￿0













i y for all ￿0
i 2 ￿(￿￿i),
the inequalities (31) and (32) are established.
Now we will construct a large enough ￿nite set of lotteries (the ￿test set￿ ) such that knowing
just an agent￿ s most preferred outcome on the test set will always reveal enough information about
his preferences to separate out a type, if it is possible to do so. This will establish the proof of
Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 7. Our proof is constructive. We ￿rst construct a set e Y consisting of the de-
generate lotteries X and the sets e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) constructed in Lemma 10, for every triple (i;￿i;￿￿i)
with ￿￿i separating ￿i. Knowing an agent￿ s ranking of each element of e Y relative to the central
lottery y would reveal all the information we need to extract. In order to extract this information
in a single choice, we let the agent pick f : e Y ! f0;1g. For each y 2 e Y , y is chosen with probability
1=e Y if f (y) = 1, otherwise the central lottery y is chosen. We let Y ￿ be the set of all such lotteries.
Now observing an agent￿ s most preferred outcome in Y ￿ reveals his binary preference between y
and each element of e Y . Since e Y contains each e Yi (￿i;￿￿i), this will ensure part (2). Since e Y
contains all the lotteries which are putting probability 1 on each pure outcome, Assumption 1
(no-complete-indi⁄erence) implies that, for each ￿i and ￿i, there exist y;y0 2 e Y such that yP￿i;￿iy0
and thus y0 = 2 BY ￿
i (￿i;￿i). This proves part (1)..
Let




Now for any f : e Y ! f0;1g, let yf be the lottery obtained by picking an element y 2 e Y with
45uniform probability and then choosing lottery y if f (y) = 1 and y if f (y) = 0. Thus we de￿ne:





f (y)(y ￿ y):





￿9f : e Y ! f0;1g such that y = yf
o
.
To prove part (1) of the Lemma, ￿x any ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i). By Lemma 1, there exists





0, if y 6= x;
1, if y = x:
So we can write:




and so yf0 = 2 BY ￿
i (￿i;￿i).
To prove part (2) of the Lemma, suppose that ￿￿i separates ￿i. Fix ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i).
By Lemma 10, there exists y 2 e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) and ￿0
i 2 ￿i such that y P￿i;￿i y and y P￿0
i;￿0
i y for all
￿0
i 2 ￿(￿￿i). So
yf 2 BY ￿
i (￿i;￿i) ) f (y) = 0;
while






) f (y) = 1,
and so
BY ￿







which establishes the result.￿
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider an arbitrary pair of types, ￿i and ￿0
i such that ￿i ￿ ￿0
i. Then






i. By the construction of the inseparable
sets ￿k














































for all " < " and mk
i 2 Mk
i . Now since ￿￿ is established in a ￿nite number of stages, it follows that
by the choosing k su¢ ciently large and " su¢ ciently small, we obtain an augmented mechanism
MK
" = M￿ such that if ￿i ￿ ￿0
i, then from the exclusion (33) and the inclusions (34) and (35), it
follows that SM￿






= ?; which establishes the result.￿
Proof of Proposition 3. (1.) Fix mutually inseparable ￿ = (￿i)
I
i=1. We will use properties of
￿ to construct a type space T . For each ￿i 2 ￿i, there exists ￿
￿i
￿i 2 ￿￿i such that ￿
￿i
￿i does not
separate ￿i. Recall that ￿￿
￿i
￿i does not separate ￿i￿means that there exists a preference relation













= Ri. Now, for each i, let


















b ￿i (￿i;￿i) , ￿i. (38)
Now consider the partition Hi of the type set Ti, as de￿ned through (36) - (38), which is generated






if ￿i = ￿0





are (T ;H)-indistinguishable. To see this, observe that since ￿i;￿0
i 2 ￿i, there exists a
common ￿￿i, namely ￿
￿i

















= 1. Now, as the type contingent
lottery e yi has to be H-measurable, it follow in particular that it has to be constant on ￿
￿i
￿i and
hence is an uncontingent lottery on ￿
￿i
￿i. But Lemma 3 shows that if any pair of payo⁄ types ￿i
and ￿0
i are pairwise inseparable, then there exists mutually inseparable ￿ = (￿i)
I







(2.) For the other direction, ￿x a type space T . Write H￿ for the limit of the sequence of
partitions de￿ned above and let ￿T




























47Intuitively, ￿i is a set of payo⁄ types that cannot be distinguished on the particular (interim) type
space T .

















AM ti. We know that for every H￿-measurable e yi, e yi ￿T





i (ti) must have the same support on elements of H￿













> 0 for all t0
i 2 H￿








which equals the uniform lottery
everywhere except on t￿i with tj ￿T
AM t￿
j for all j 6= i, i.e.,
e yi (t￿i) = y if not tj ￿T
AM t￿
j for some j.

















that by construction ￿i is not separated by ￿￿i. Thus ￿ is mutually inseparable. ￿
The proof of Proposition 4 will follow directly from the monotone behavior of the following









































but without necessarily coming from the separation property as ￿k+1
j in (39). However, for agent
i, ￿k





































sequence is nested in the other, or for all k, b ￿k
￿i ￿ ￿k
￿i. We then compare the resulting limit set
for agent i with respect to ￿k
￿i and b ￿k
￿i respectively. Correspondingly, we denote the respective
limit sets of agent i by ￿￿
i and b ￿￿
i.
Lemma 11 (Monotonicity I) If for all k, b ￿k
￿i ￿ ￿k
￿i, then b ￿￿
i ￿ ￿￿
i.
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that for all k, b ￿k
i ￿ ￿k
i . The proof is by induction. By construction
it is true for k = 0. Suppose now that it holds for k and we want to establish that it holds for k+1.
By assumption, b ￿k
i ￿ ￿k
i and hence consider a set ￿i 2 ￿k
i \ b ￿k
i . Now suppose that ￿i 2 b ￿k+1
i and
we want to show that ￿i 2 ￿k+1
i . We observe that if ￿i 2 b ￿k+1
i , then there exists some ￿￿i 2 ￿k
￿i
such that ￿￿i does not separate ￿i. But by assumption the set ￿￿i 2 ￿k
￿i, and hence it follows
that ￿i 2 ￿k+1
i as well.
Lemma 12 (Monotonicity II) If b ￿i > ￿i, then for all k, ￿k
i ￿ b ￿k
i .
Proof. The proof is by induction. By construction it is true for k = 0. Suppose now that it
holds for k and we want to establish that it holds for k + 1. By assumption, ￿k
i ￿ b ￿k
i and hence
consider a set ￿i 2 ￿k
i \ b ￿k
i . Now suppose that ￿i 2 ￿k+1
i and we want to show that ￿i 2 b ￿k+1
i .
We observe that if ￿i 2 ￿k+1
i , then there exists some ￿￿i 2 ￿k
￿i such that ￿￿i does not separate
￿i. In other words, there exists for every ￿i 2 ￿i a belief ￿i (￿j￿i) 2 ￿(￿￿i) such that for all x 2 X
and all ￿0
i;￿00






































































































We can easily verify that by letting for all ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i the beliefs b ￿i (￿￿i j￿i) be de￿ned by:
b ￿i (￿￿i j￿i) ,
(1 ￿ b ￿i)￿i









b ￿i ￿ ￿i




49we satisfy (43) if and only if we satisfy (42). Now since b ￿i > ￿i, it follows that
(1 ￿ b ￿i)￿i
b ￿i (1 ￿ ￿i)
< 1;
and hence the conditional probability distribution b ￿i (￿￿i j￿i) is well-de￿ned if, as assumed, ￿i (￿￿i j￿i)
is well-de￿ned. But now it follows that ￿i 2 b ￿k+1
i as well.
Proof of Proposition 4. (1.) For ￿ = 0, we have by the de￿nition of the private value utility






= ?. Hence it follows that we have











. For ￿ = 1, we have by the de￿nition of the interdependent










and hence for all i, ￿￿
i (1) = 2￿in?.
(2.) It su¢ ces to establish the result component-wise. We thus consider b ￿ ￿ ￿ such that b ￿i > ￿i
for some i and b ￿j = ￿j for all j 6= i. Now suppose that for some agent l, we have ￿￿
l (￿) 6= ￿￿
l (b ￿).
Then there must be a ￿rst stage k0 such that ￿k0
l (￿) 6= ￿k0
l (b ￿), but for all k < k0, we have for all
l; ￿k
l (￿) = ￿k
l (b ￿). Now since we only changed the preferences of agent i, and k0 is the ￿rst stage
where the sets ￿k0
l (￿) and ￿k0
l (b ￿) di⁄er, it must be that l = i. But now it follows from Lemma 12
that ￿k0
i (￿) ￿ ￿k0
i (b ￿). Suppose now that there is step k00 > k0 such that there exists j 6= i such
that ￿k00
j (￿) 6= ￿k00
j (b ￿), but for all k < k00, we have ￿k
j (￿) = ￿k
j (b ￿). Now we can apply Lemma 11
to conclude that ￿k
j (￿) ￿ ￿k
j (b ￿). Now a monotonicity argument of either Lemma 11 or 12 applies
at every further step along the sequence and hence we have shown that for all j, including i, we
have ￿k
j (￿) ￿ ￿k
j (b ￿) for all k and this establishes the result. ￿
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